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Abstract
In the last decade or so, the major development agencies have ex-
plicitly turned the spotlights on ‘knowledge for development’, ‘ict for
development’, or the ‘knowledge economy’ as new panacea to prompt
development. This article argues, first, that knowledge and technology
have always been integrally part of the very idea of ‘development’ since
its emergence during Enlightenment. Recent appeals to knowledge or
technology for development should be placed in an age-long genealogy of
similar rationales. Second, the article elucidates that discourses about
the roles of knowledge and technology in development have always varied
widely, with deterministic and less deterministic interpretations often ex-
isting along each other. In this article, the many different interpretations
are unravelled. Even today, very opposing roles are ascribed to knowledge
and technology in development. Whereas strong versions of technological
and epistemic determinism still reverberate in some present-day develop-
ment discourses, they are simultaneously countered by discourses focusing
on ‘capacity building’.
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1 Introduction
Point four of president Harry Truman’s inaugural address, pronounced on 20 Jan-
uary 1949 in front of the us congress, has been quoted by many scholars, to the
point of weariness, as emblematic mile stone or even starting point of interna-
tional development cooperation. Let me highlight one passage of the speech:
“We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits
of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the
improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. [. . . ] For the
first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and skill to
relieve suffering of these people.” (Truman, 1949)
Nearly half a century later the World Bank published the 1998/1999 World
Development Report, entitled Knowledge for Development. The report opened
with this statement:
“Knowledge is like light. Weightless and intangible, it can easily
travel the world, enlightening the lives of people everywhere. Yet
billions of people still live in the darkness of poverty – unnecessarily.
[. . . ] Poor countries –and poor people– differ from rich ones not only
because they have less capital but because they have less knowledge.
Knowledge is often costly to create, and that is why much of it is
created in industrial countries. But developing countries can acquire
knowledge overseas as well as create their own at home.” (world
bank, 1998)
The similarity between the two statements, although half a century lies in
between, is striking. Both quotes, however, evoke similar questions. Which
knowledge or technology will reduce poverty or lead to development? Is West-
ern knowledge apt for that? Can Western knowledge and technology be trans-
ferred to non-Western contexts? How to do that? How to stimulate domestic
knowledge generation? These are some of the questions that have pervaded
development discourses over more than half a century.
Closely related to the practical questions of knowledge and technology trans-
fer, are ethical and socio-political concerns. It has since long been denounced
that the hegemony of the West is partly reproduced through a continued cog-
nitive or epistemic ‘colonialism’. The West is said to establish the criteria for
what counts as ‘valuable knowledge’ and what not, while obviously the West
itself is the major producer of such knowledge (Escobar, 1995). Recent appeals
to ‘knowledge for development’ have stirred up again the discussion about the
hegemonic character of Western knowledge in development (Mehta, 2001; Stone,
2003; To¨bbe Gonalves, 2006, among others).
The present article does not enter into this post-developmentalist debate
about presumed Western cognitive hegemony, nor does it propose yet another
theory on how to make knowledge in development aid work. Instead, the article
examines the idea that ‘development’ and ‘development aid’ have to do with
‘knowledge’ and ‘technology’. The article wants to give an overview of –and
disentangle– the many different roles that have been allotted to knowledge in
development cooperation, in an attempt to show the often conflicting polisemy.
I advance the two main conclusions of the article. First, I maintain that
recent appeals to ‘knowledge for development’, ‘ict for development’, or stimu-
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lating the ‘knowledge economy’ in developing countries, are not original at all.
By means of a brief genealogy, I will demonstrate that knowledge and technol-
ogy have always been integrally part of the very idea of ‘development’, since the
emergence of this Western concept during Enlightenment. The entire history of
‘development cooperation’ is characterised by the long struggle of trying to find
the right role for knowledge and technology in development.
Second, I want to point out that discourses about the roles of knowledge and
technology in development have always varied widely, with deterministic and
less deterministic interpretations often existing along each other.
Before sketching the genealogy, I will first introduce a unifying theoretical
framework for knowledge and technology, so that I can treat knowledge and
technology (K&T) as two components of a larger whole. I will also introduce the
concept ‘technological determinism’ and extend it to ‘epistemic determinism’.
I will relate them to the concept ‘technology transfer’. The third section of
the article sketches the genealogy. The fourth part discusses the competing
interpretations of K&T in development discourses and re-emphasises the need to
situate them in the wide, historical perspective I will have sketched throughout
the article.
2 Technological and epistemic determinism
Technological determinism In modernised societies, technologies and tech-
nological artefacts are rapidly changing the ways of communicating, socialising,
working, travelling,. . . and people have grown accustomed to this apparent power
of advancing technology. To them, the steady growth of technology may appear
as simply a characteristic of modern society (Marx and Smith, 1994, p. ix). The
ideology that technological advances would be the main driver of social change
is called ‘technological determinism’. Actually, scholars have determined that
full-blown, or ‘nomological’, technological determinism is composed of two dif-
ferent but complementary ideas (Bimber, 1994; Kline, 2001; Wyatt, 2008). The
first idea is that technology would evolve independently from society, follow-
ing its own inherent, unilinear, incremental logic. The second idea is that this
technological change would drive –or determine– social change.
The technological determinism ideology is omnipresent in daily life, popu-
lar narratives and even scholarly literature. Advertisers invoke it to make you
believe that their technological novelty will change our life. It is conveyed in
popular narratives, telling us that “the discovery of penicillin gave us high life
expectancy”. Karl Marx flirted with technological determinism when he fa-
mously claimed that “the hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the
steam-mill society with the industrial capitalist” (Marx, 1920). Technological
determinism also reverberates in many political and development discourses:
“the Information Revolution, and particularly the phenomenon of
the Internet [. . . ] is leading the process of globalisation: wound-
ing those who dont quickly enough grasp how to use it [. . . ] but
providing unprecedented benefits for those with the courage and
willingness to grasp its potential to drive change [. . . ] Ict is trans-
forming everything it touches, from politics, to business, to culture,
to education and to health.” (undp address in Tokyo, 2000, cited in
Wilson, 2002, emphases are mine)
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Despite this apparent omnipresence, historians and sociologists of science
and technology have convincingly demonstrated that technological determin-
ism is wrong to a large extent (for an overview, see Bijker, 1995; Oudshoorn
and Pinch, 2008). The ideology has been described as “intellectually poor and
politically debilitating” (Bijker, 2010). Indeed, there does not exist a unidirec-
tional causal link between technological change and social change –as technog-
ical determinism suggests– nor does technology develop along its own inherent
goal-directed path. Technological change does not come from major break-
throughs or giant discontinuities that diffuse throughout society, as Schumpeter
represented it (1934). Rather, technological change is a continuous stream of
innumerable minor adjustments, recombinations or reinterpretations of existing
technologies; it happens through of a complex network of actors, user groups
and governmental bodies; it is stimulated and modified by market demands and
political concerns. Neither does a technology, once introduced in society, take
on a life on its own. The computer, as we know it today, has evolved over more
than a century and is profoundly shaped by its uses and by its users.
Summarising, society and technology co-evolve in an intimate way: technol-
ogy is socially (and politically) constructed while society (including politics) is
technically built (Bijker, 2010). Recent theoretical models of the technology-
society interaction, such as the Social Construction of Technology (Pinch and
Bijker, 1984), Actor-Network Theory (Callon and Law, 1982; Callon, 1986; La-
tour, 1987) or the Transformational Model of Technical Activity (Lawson, 2007),
manage to navigate between the Scylla of pure technological determinism and
the Charybdis of pure social constructionism.
Technology transfer So, if technology intimately evolves with society, and
technological change does not produce social change in an unequivocal way, then,
the transfer of technology from one social context –say, the Western world– to
a completely different social context –say, a country in the Global South– in
order to prompt some kind of social change –say, ‘development’– is also very
problematic. Again, two subideas underlie the technology transfer ideology.
First, it supposes that technology can be detached from its social context and
can be re-implemented without much trouble in a new context. Second, it seems
to believe that a technology, implemented in the new social context, will recreate
the same social and economic configurations (e.g. ‘economic development’) as
in the original social context. Obviously, both affirmations are false. Transfer of
technology has been criticised for ideological, epistemological and organisational
reasons.
Visvanathan (2001) reminds us that the first serious, ideological criticisms
to the transfer of technology came from the developing world. The Dependency
School (also treated below), for instance, denounced that the underdeveloped
or ‘peripheral’ countries of the world were presented as passive recipients of
technology from the ‘center’ and that, as a result, industrialisation was a process
over which the ‘recipients’ were denied control. Moreover, Visvanathan also
points to the pernicious effects of inappropriate technology transfer, causing
more refugees in the developing world than war does (Visvanathan, 2001).
Epistemological criticisms emphasise that there is more to technology than
only the technological artefact. Nathan Rosenberg, already in 1970, contended
that technology transfer for the development of poor countries is problematic.
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He elicited, using historical material from the nineteenth century, that even the
transfer of industrial technology from the UK to the United States –considered
to have very similar socio-cultural contexts– proved to be difficult and that it
relied almost exclusively “upon the transfer of skilled personnel” and on-the-job
learning rather than the transfer of technological artefacts (Rosenberg, 1970). In
fact, a technological artefact is surrounded by what Polanyi (1966) called ‘tacit
knowledge’, and what contemporary psychology calls ‘implicit knowledge’. It
refers to the “acquisition of knowledge that takes place largely independently
of conscious attempts to learn and largely in the absence of explicit knowledge
about what was acquired” (Reber, 1993, p.5).
A complete model of what composes technology, is given by Dosi and Grazzi
(2010). They define technology as a “human-constructed means for achieving a
particular end”. Their model of technology (figure 1) includes four components:
(i) the procedures or recipes to achieve the desired ends, (ii) the technological
artefacts involved in these procedures, (iii) physical inputs to yield the desired
outcomes, and (iv) particular bits of knowledge. All four composing elements
of a technology are socially embedded and shaped.
Figure 1: The components of technology, based on Dosi and Grazzi (2010).
I also mention the efforts of organisational and managerial sciences to crit-
ically analyse technology transfer. These scholars, too, emphasise that various
knowledge ‘barriers’ hamper any technology transfer (e.g. Argyris and Scho¨n,
1978; Carlile, 2004). Barriers are always there: they exist between two persons,
between different departments within the same organisation, between different
organisations, between nations or between cultures. Depending on the amount
and type of knowledge that is present at both sides of the barrier, the transfer
of knowledge or technology will be more or less difficult (Carlile, 2004). Plain
transfer is only possible if, and only if, both sides share enough common knowl-
edge, both sides know the differences in their knowledge, and have sufficient
access to the domain-specific knowledge of the other side. In the case that the
novelty of the situation is too great, the knowledge of both sides needs to be
‘translated’ before new, common knowledge can be created. The most difficult
problem appears when the novelty of the situation produces different (political)
interests for both sides. In this case, the creation of common knowledge is a
matter of re-negotiating common (political) interests.
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Epistemic determinism I have introduced the concept of technological de-
terminism and explained that it is highly contested by historians and sociologists
of technology. Technology and society co-evolve in an intimate way. As a result,
the transfer of technology from one social context to a completely different one
is highly problematic, since all elements composing a technology, including the
bits of knowledge related to it, are socially embedded.
Social scientists emphasise that all knowledge, even scientific knowledge, is
partial and embedded in a social context. This idea was already present in the
work of Nietzsche who rejected the possibility of a non-perspectival knowing
subject. Instead, he maintains that:
“There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing’; and
the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes,
different eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more complete
will our ‘concept’ of this thing, our ‘objectivity’, be.” (Nietzche,
1887, p.119)
The same idea was supported by George Herbert Mead’s work on perspectives
(Mead, 1927), by the Harvard sociologists and their symbolic interactionism,
and by Bourdieu and his concepts ‘habitus’ and ‘doxa’ (Bourdieu, 1980). After
the post-modern turn, Donna Haraway’s concept of ‘situated knowledge’ has
found most resonance (Haraway, 1988). All knowledge, even our best scientific
knowledge of the natural world, is conditioned by the partiality of its material,
technical, social, semiotic and embodied means of reproduction.
From Dosi and Grassi’s model of technology (2010) we can intuitively under-
stand that technological knowledge is largely embedded in the social context.
The claim that even scientific knowledge is situated, might appear more con-
troversial, but it follows the same logic of situated knowledge. The fact is this:
science is not a disembodied, timeless entity, but it is a practice that is incar-
nated in human beings (Turnbull, 2002). In fact, scientists are human beings
with a specific background, pertain to a limited social class, hold particular
values about their life and their profession, and are tied together in particular
social communities. These people decide on how the world is. “Of course, they
typically do this based on as much evidence as they can generate. But, in the
end, people decide; the world does not. [. . . ] The worth of knowledge is de-
cided in communities” (Yearly, 2005, p.110-111). This conclusion is valid for all
knowledge production — scientific or not.
As a result, claims of universality are now considered naive at best, but more
often they are deconstructed by social scientists as hegemonic strategies that
seek to overrule other perspectives (Foucault, 1980; Thompson, 2001). When a
piece of knowledge is claimed to be universal, objective and accumulative, this is
not because they are inherent characteristics of the knowledge itself, but because
they are rather produced by the collective work of a community. Standardisation
and homogenisation are typical techniques for rendering knowledge universal
and hegemonic (Turnbull, 2002).
In analogy with technological determinism, I define ‘epistemic determinism’
the two-headed ideology that (i) knowledge is an immaterial good that is in-
dependent from the social context, and (ii), that this immaterial good can be
transferred, without much effort, to another social reality where it will have
similar meanings and effects as in the original social reality.
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Summarising, technological determinism does not acknowledge that technol-
ogy and society co-evolve, while epistemic determinism does not recognise that
all knowledge is situated.
Following the model of Dosi and Grazzi (2010), I will from now on treat
knowledge and technology as two closely related concepts: K&T. The same is
true for the transfer of technology and the transfer of knowledge.
Methodological relativism Saying that knowledge is ‘situated’ or ‘socially
embedded’, or that technology is ‘socially constructed’, does not imply cognitive
relativism. The literature on situated knowledge is as hostile to relativism as
to realism (Thompson, 2001). Instead, scholars in the sociology of science and
technology defend a stance of methodological relativism. Their analysis does
not judge which knowledge is true and which is not, nor which technology is
the most adequate. They take a neutral stance and only analyse why certain
technologies work in a specific social context and others not. They argue, for
instance, that an artefact’s ‘success’ or ‘failure’ or its technical ‘working’ or
‘non-working’ are subject to social variables and are not intrinsic properties of
the technological artefacts themselves (Bijker, 2010).
Neither is this article a plea against the transfer of K&T in development
cooperation. It does, however, plea against epistemic and technological deter-
minism in the development discourses. If we want to give a role to K&T in
development, we need to understand and take into account their social embed-
dedness.
Let me summarise this section about epistemic and technological determin-
ism by applying Dosi and Grazzi’s model of technology to an example: the
example of a high-yielding rice seed, produced in the laboratories of a multina-
tional biotechnology concern. A us farmer will use the seed –the technological
artefact– to a certain means: he will want to sell the harvest. He has some
knowledge on how to use the seed, when and how to plant, the amount of fer-
tiliser needed. He needs knowledge about the weather, the seasons, and the
particularities of the soil at his farm. The procedures to use the technological
artefacts include: buying the seed, planting, curing, irrigating, using fertiliser,
harvesting, selling the harvest,. . . His inputs are mainly capital. This farmer
has certain established channels through which he might influence agricultural
policies in the us and eventually the company that designed the seeds.
The same artefact (the seeds), used by a subsistence farmer in Mali, probably
serves a different goal and is surrounded by different technological knowledge,
different procedures and different input. This Malian farmer probably sells only
a minor part of his harvest, since his main goal is subsistence. His procedures
to obtain the seeds, the fertilisers and irrigation water are completely different
than those of the us farmer. His view on ecology, on the performance of the soil,
the variability of weather and seasons is probably very different than those of
the us farmer. His political relations with fellow farmers and his government are
very different, as are the channels through which he might influence the design
of the seeds by the multinational company —they are probably non-existent.
He relies mostly on labour as input, rather than capital. In short, the package of
technological knowledge, procedures and input that surrounds the technological
artefact is much different than the package of his us counterpart –not only
the content of the package but also how this content is embedded in the social
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context.
Now, imagine the high barrier that hampered the transfer of this technology
–the high-yielding rice seed– form the us context –where it proved to work flaw-
lessly– to the Malian context. The pre-existing knowledge at both sides of the
barrier was very different due to the different socio-economic context, as are the
(political) interests of both farmers. The technology nor the related knowledge
could be transferred straightforwardly. Neither has the transfer reconfigured
the socio-economic relations of Malian farmer according to the us model. The
technology (the entire package) and the socio-economic relations of the Malian
farmer are co-evolving in a new way, different from his traditional life but also
different from the us agricultural model.
3 A genealogy of knowledge and technology in
development
Other authors have sketched overviews of the role of knowledge (King and Mc-
Grath, 2004; Wilson, 2007; Cozzens et al., 2008) or Western science (Shah, 2009)
in development discourses. They focused on specific subsets of the K&T ensem-
ble. In this section I want to present a broader genealogy that goes further back
in time.
The genealogy that is briefly summarised in this section is a general ge-
nealogy of the principal invocations and manipulations of K&T for the sake of
development. It is not a historical account of a continuous evolution towards
‘better practices’. Instead, this article is a genealogical account –in Nietzschean-
Foucaultian sense– that pays attention to abrupt changes, parallel discourses,
overturns in vocabulary, and the external forces at work in these changes. There
is no clear origin, as Nietzsche would say (Foucault, 1991), but there can be
traced an emergence and a descent of K&T in development. Or, as Derrida
would say, the discourses have “always already” been there, and their roots can
“always already” be discerned in the past (Derrida, 1978).
The genealogy of this section will be re-discussed in the fourth section of
the article, where I will hold it against the light of epistemic and technological
determinism.
Enlightenment The genealogy of ‘knowledge in development’ is closely re-
lated to that of the ‘development’ idea itself. At first sight ‘development’ seems
a natural concept that is part of nature and human nature, and isomorphically
applicable to societies and economies. Nothing, however, is further from the
truth. Development in its social and economic sense —and in particular its
linear, accumulative and unlimited character— is considered the brain child of
a Western world view (Escobar, 1995; Rist, 1996).
“That growth and progress can develop ad infinitum, this is an affir-
mation that radically distinguishes Western culture from all others”
(Rist, 1996, p.389).
Yes, in the writings of Aristotle (384 bc - 322 bc) ‘nature’ equals ‘develop-
ment’, since the word for nature ϕυσις derives from the verb ϕυω, which means
‘to grow’ or ‘to develop’. But it did not yet mean infinite growth. Aristotle saw
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nature as cyclic, developing through the stages of birth, growth, decline and
death, without ever reaching the perfect state.
Saint Augustine (354-430) introduced ‘God’ in natural history and linearised
growth and development. Everything was believed to develop in a teleologic
way according God’s plan towards the inevitable end. Nothing was accepted
any more to be cyclic –only Jesus Christ had resurrected.
Another legate of Augustine in the sciences was the conviction of the absolute
wisdom of the Ancients. The famous aphorism “we are dwarfs perched on the
shoulders of giants” was coined in the xxii century by Bernard of Chartres. It
emphasised –in line with twelfth century thinking– the grandeur of the classical
Greek and Roman authorities and the impossibility to go beyond the knowledge
they had produced (Rist, 1996).
Only in the xvi and xvii century, with Bacon, Descartes and Pascal, this
unsurpassable status of Ancient knowledge was challenged. Descartes wrote
around 1628 that “we shouldn’t give great credit to the Ancients on account of
their antiquity [. . . ] For the world is older now than it was then, and we have
a greater experience of things” (Descartes, 4 74, p.204). Bernard Le Bovier de
Fontenelle wrote that “a great, savage mind is, so to speak, composed by all
great minds of all preceding centuries; [. . . ] mankind will never degenerate and
the sane voices of all the great minds that follow will always add one to another”
(Fontanelle, 1688, my translation).
The old aphorism of the dwarf on the shoulders of the giant was recovered
during Enlightenment, but acquired a new sense. It now paraphrased the sup-
posed accumulative character of knowledge: all future generations can benefit
from the body of knowledge that has been built up, and they can add their own
little piece of knowledge to it. A decline of knowledge and science was believed
to be impossible (Rist, 1996, p.62-70). According to Rist, this enlightened idea
of the cumulative character or knowledge is in clear opposition to, on the one
hand, the Ancients’ aversion of infinity, and, on the other hand, the Augustinian
faith in the inevitable end of the world.
The supposed accumulative character of knowledge and its beneficial effects
were contested by only a minority of contemporary thinkers. Famous is the po-
sition of Rousseau who sustained in Du contrat social that “the progresses” are
the results of our vices and our vain curiosity (Rousseau, 1750). His scepticism
was shared by xviii century philosophers David Hume and Adam Ferguson.
Hume wrote that “when the arts and sciences come to perfection in any state,
from that moment they naturally, or rather necessarily, decline, and seldom or
never revive in that nation where they formerly flourished” (Hume, 1752, p.146).
Despite the dissident voices, what is left by the end of the eighteenth century
is the hegemonic idea of uni-linear progress and infinite growth in our knowl-
edge of the natural world. Not surprisingly, Merrit R. Smith (1994) argues that
Enlightenment was also the cradle of the technological determinsm ideology. All
streams of thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth century –the enthousiastic
as well as the critical– held that technology and science are powerful agents of
social change. So, if knowledge was believed accumulative, then also the com-
plexity of technology would be accumulative, and so would be the sophistication
of socio-economic organisation. According to Rist, the Enlightenment laid the
basis for our contemporary idea that “the development of societies, of knowl-
edge and of wealth corresponds with a natural, auto-dynamic principle” (Rist,
1996, p.69).
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Now, I go a step further: the first enlightened voices that called to export
European ‘progresses’ to the colonies, invoked precisely Europe’s knowledge
superiority as a pretext for the need to export the European ‘progresses’. Con-
dorcet, last of the Encyclope´distes –and a fervent critic of slavery– wrote in 1793
that:
“The Europeans [. . . ] will disseminate, in Africa and in Asia, the
European principles and example of freedom, of the enlightened, and
of reason. [. . . ] [The colonies] are just waiting for our help to become
civilised, and are waiting to find brothers among the Europeans, in
order to become their friends and pupils.”
(Condorcet, Marquis de, 1793, p.316-7, translation and emphasis are
mine).
Apparently the teacher-pupil relationship –with Europe in the role of the teacher–
was already part of the progress ideology in the second half of the eighteenth
century.
Stages in knowledge, stages in development The rise of social evolu-
tionism in the nineteenth century moulded in an important way Western think-
ing concerning development. All societies of this planet were believed to pass
through a number of stages of evolution, form savagery to civilisation. More-
over, the path was said to be universal, hence identical for all societies, and
this created a unifying bond amongst all peoples. This also meant that, while
savage tribes in the colonies were believed to led the life that our ancestors had
led some millennia ago, evolution would inevitably transform their society in a
society similar to the European.
The successive stages of social evolution were characterised by increasing
complexity in social organisation, technology and knowledge. In this sense, so-
cial evolutionism added two meanings to K&T in development. First, August
Comte argued that human thought “passes successively through three different
theoretical conditions: the theological or fictitious; the metaphysical, or ab-
stract; and the scientic, or positive” (Comte, 1830, p.71). As a consequence, the
Western society was presented to have superior knowledge –in an absolute man-
ner– with respect to non-European societies, since Europe was in the utmost
advanced stage of evolution. Second, the type of K&T that a society possessed,
such as its agricultural techniques, tools, technology, writing system,. . . , were
a measure to determine the evolutionary stage in which the society found itself
at that moment (e.g. Morgan, 1877).
By the nineteenth century Europe had already a long history as coloniser,
but social evolutionism put colonialism into a new perspective. While for three
centuries the main driver of Western expansion was the allurement of gold –and
to a minor extent Christianisation– the wave of new colonisation at the end
of the eighteenth century was explained by the need for larger markets for
the expanding European industry (Arndt, 1987). Freedom of commerce was
considered to be much more advantageous than a protective state control over
commercial activities in the colonies. Social evolutionism was a helping hand in
this new quest: it gave a philanthropic touch to new colonial expansion.
Characteristic is the 1885 Berlin Treaty that regulated the division of Africa
among European countries – the so-called ‘scramble for Africa’. At that time,
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the French colonial doctrine was dictated by Jules Ferry, minister of external af-
fairs, who sustained that “superior races have rights over inferior races, because
they also have obligations towards them; they have the obligation to civilise the
inferior races” (Ferry, 1885, translation is mine). Moreover, Ferry contended
that the territories that wouldn’t be colonised by France, would be colonised by
other nations, probably “with less noble intentions”.
Ferry’s position was characteristic of his time, but it was also contested. A
contemporary politician wondered “what kind of civilisation is it that we impose
by cannon shot? Isn’t it just another form of barbarianism? Don’t these peoples
of inferior race have equal rights as us?” (Ferry, 1885, translation is mine).
It needs to be underlined that the objective of civilising the ‘inferior races’
was, at that time, still completely detached from the idea of stimulating their
economic development (Arndt, 1987). Economic development was still reserved
to the European economies.
Social evolutionism was also reflected in the philosophy of the League of Na-
tions, founded in 1919. The Covenant of the League of Nations is the first official
document that mentions the concept ‘development’ and the idea that nations
and peoples can ‘develop’ over time. Article 22 of the Covenant, that regulated
the Mandatories of some member nations over others on behalf of the League,
defended these Mandatories in terms of the different stages of development.
Technical Assistance for economic development President Harry Tru-
man’s famous speech of 1949 has been partly cited in the introduction of this
article. The world remembers, above all, Point Four of the speech, in which
he clearly stated that the developed peoples needed to help the underdeveloped
ones. The scope: maintaining world peace. The means: the transfer of scientific
knowledge and industrial technology. In his speech he clearly divided the world
in a developed and an underdeveloped part (Escobar, 1995) – a division that
was more glaring than the one in the Covenant of the League of Nations.
By proposing the transfer of scientific knowledge and industrial technology
as cure for underdevelopment, Truman simply expressed the zeitgeist ; he did not
initiate a new movement. David Landes recalls the British groundnut scheme,
implemented in Tanganyika over the period 1946-54, as “the mother” of all tech-
nology transfer projects (1998, p.501). The groundnut scheme had to show what
the British government was capable of when it harnessed modern Western tech-
nology and expertise in their colonies. Although the peanuts were not destined
for the African but for the British market, it was argued that the local farmers
would learn from the large-scale industrialisation in agriculture and successfully
copy it. The project turned into a blatant fiasco from every point of view , due
to bad planning, a lack of local capacities, and adversary ecological conditions.
After eight years, the project had even worsened the socio-economic situation
of the local farmers (Havinden and Meredith, 1993, p.276-83).
The idea that Western K&T were the solution to generate progress and
economic development was also at the basis of the conception of ‘Technical As-
sistance’ (ta) as instrument for development aid. Trough 1947 and 1948 the
term ta was coined to indicate the help that was offered from the un Eco-
nomic Affairs Department to underdeveloped countries. In 1949, under impetus
of Truman’s Point Four, an Expanded Program of Technical Assistance was
created, managed by the un (for a complete history see Owen, 1959). It was es-
11
sentially a programme of unidirectional knowledge transfer, that was supposed
to be apolitical. Local knowledge or traditions were mainly seen as obstacles,
as expressed by the un in 1951: “rapid economic progress is impossible with-
out painful adjustments. Ancient philosophies have to be scrapped; old social
institutions have to disintegrate” (un, 1951, p.15, cited in Escobar, 1995, p.4).
As said earlier, Truman’s idea to apply Western scientific knowledge and in-
dustrial technology in underdeveloped regions was not original. But he brought
the economic meaning of ‘development’ to the front. The underdeveloped re-
gions had to ‘catch up’ and develop their own capitalistic economy to the model
of the developed West. Truman contended in his speech that more produc-
tion equalled less poverty and more prosperity (Truman, 1949). This was con-
firmed by David Owen, the head of the UN Economic Affairs Department and
later chairman of the Technical Assistance Board, who stated that “technical
assistance [puts] into wide practice the concept of sharing economic skill and
knowledge, [and this] gives every country the opportunity of being a partner in
economic development” (Owen, 1959).
As a result, in the first two decades the focus of development assistance was
exclusively on economic development. The ta programme of the un and loans
of the World Bank were aimed at giving ‘the big push’ and offering ‘tech-fix’
assistance, mostly in the form of large infrastructure and technology works, in
an attempt to start weaving the network of economic activity. This development
assistance was backed by a specific stream of economic thought: Rostow (1960),
for instance, argued in an evolutionist e´lan that development passed through
four “stages of economic growth”, while Kuznets (1955) sustained that in an
economically developing society the wealth gap between the poor and the rich
automatically diminishes.
The absolute power of Western science and technology, and the conviction
that this scientific knowledge was a global good, set the tone in 1963 at the first
un Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of
the Less Developed Areas in Geneva. The conference was taken as a scientific
rather than a political meeting. Scientists and technical experts dominated the
Geneva conference, 84% of them coming from the developed world (Standke,
2006).
Surprisingly, David Owen, chairman of the un Technical Assistance Board
and generally well aligned with Truman’s visions, anticipated already in 1950
much of the criticism on ta that would start growing in the 1960s and 1970s.
I quote him at length:
“An economic mission from any one of the great industrial powers,
no matter how benevolent the intentions, may [. . . ] be met with
charges [. . . ] that its purpose is to bring the country under some
form of foreign economic domination, that it is the instrument of
foreign monopolists, and so on. [. . . ]
Moreover, even if the good intentions of the mission are fully ap-
preciated, there remains the danger of a one-sided approach to the
solution of the technical problems which the mission encounters. It is
only natural that technical experts from any one country will be in-
clined to recommend a duplication of the institutions, organization,
and techniques which have proved successful in their own country,
though in many cases these solutions are not necessarily compatible
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with the social and political structure of the recipient.” (Owen, 1950,
emphases are mine)
The Expanded Program of Technical Assistance merged in 1965 with the
smaller Special Fund to form the still existing undp. The early concerns about
ta, expressed by Owen (1950), continued to grow throughout the sixties. For
instance, in 1968 Mathiasen wrote that although the number of development
projects continued to grow, “persistent questions [were] raised about their effec-
tiveness”, especially questions related to the “sense that knowledge and ideas
cannot be quickly –or usefully– transferred across cultural and scientific bound-
aries” (Mathiasen, 1968). These discussions, however, were still about how to
improve the effectiveness of ta. They did not question the epistemological
premises of the unidirectional transfer of K&T from the West to the underde-
veloped world.
Technical Assistance for poverty alleviation A less economicist wind
started to blow in the World Bank with the appointment of Robert McNamara
to its leadership in 1968. Attention started to shift to equity concerns in devel-
opment and to the needs of the very poor (Nolan, 2002). This is not surprising.
Two decades of ta had not brought about convincing results. Moreover, crit-
icism culminated in the late sixties and early seventies with the emergence of
the Dependency School (e.g. Frank, 1969; Cardoso and Faletto, 1969, also men-
tioned in section 2), a group of critical scholars and policy-makers based in Latin
America. They argued that the ‘centre’ of the world (the West) had developed
at the expense of the ‘periphery’ (the ex-colonies), as if underdevelopment and
development were communicating vessels, and that this unequal relation still
persisted in development cooperation. The Dependency School criticised the
technology transfer from the ‘centre’ to the ‘periphery’, since it created depen-
dency.
The new wind in the late sixties provoked a clear shift in the types of projects
and programs of the World Bank and undp. Although the agencies continued
to finance large infrastructure to some extent, they started to be primarily
concerned with rural development, poverty alleviation, job creation, and the
reinforcement of local organisations. The development support from the North
was now directed to grassroot development. The new paradigms of that time
were ‘integrated rural development’ and ‘community participation’ in planning
and implementation (Nolan, 2002).
Another expression of this attention to the poorest was the search for new
forms of ‘appropriate’ or ‘alternative’ technologies, more adaptable to the local
contexts in underdeveloped regions (Visvanathan, 2001). In the early 1970s,
Schumacher (1973) elaborated on the idea of ‘intermediate technologies’ for
development, which was initially used to indicated technologies that float some-
where between traditional village techniques and advanced capital intensive
technologies of the Western world (Murphy et al., 2009). The term was soon
replaced by ‘appropriate technologies’, indicating any technology that is small-
scale, labour intensive rather than capital intensive, energy efcient, environmen-
tally sustainable, and controlled and maintained by the local community of a
developing region (Hazeltine and Bull, 1999; Murphy et al., 2009). The con-
cept of appropriate technology and some sensibility for local knowledges were
gradually adopted in World Bank models of technology transfer (Visvanathan,
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2001), in order to improve the technology transfer. There were no attempts yet,
within the development agencies, to question the ideology of technology transfer
itself. Western science and technology continued to be seen as transferable to
all corners of the planet.
It would be unfair to argue that before McNamara there was no attention
at all for poor rural farmers. Already in the fourties the Rockefeller Foun-
dation created in Mexico a research centre dedicated to develop high yielding
wheat and maize varieties for the Mexican market (Ross, 2003). In 1963 the
centre was given its current name Centro Internacional para el Mejoramiento
del Maiz y del Trigo (cimmyt). A similar centre for the improvement of rice
(irri) was set up in the Philippines. The ‘Green Revolution’ started in those
laboratories in the fourties and culminated in 1970 in a Nobel Peace Price for
cimmyt’s principal researcher Norman Borlaugh. In 1971, under the impulse of
the World Bank, these agricultural research centres were grouped under a new
international, publicly funded, umbrella organisation: the Consultative Group
on International Agricultural Research (cgiar).
Although these initiatives show that there was already attention paid to
the well-being of the rural populations, two remarks need to be made. First,
this attention to the poorest –already present in Truman’s speech and in the
discourses of other development actors in the fourties– mostly stemmed from
a concern about the rise of communism. Secure food production, they said,
was essential to keep the poor rural populations in developing countries ‘happy’
and keep them away from communism. Second, in the 1940s, 50s and 60s the
main scope of development aid was, without doubt, economic growth and the
production of material goods. Along with economic growth, rural poverty would
reduce. Only towards the end of the sixties, this relation was turned upside down
and poverty reduction was put above economic growth.
Building Science and Technology Capacities in the South Since the
late sixties, the world also witnessed the increasing bargaining power of the
developing countries at the international political stage (Rist, 1996). The ‘non-
aligned’ countries had adopted, at the 1970 Lusaka conference, the concept of
‘collective self-reliance’, while in 1974 the Group of 77 proposed a ‘New Interna-
tional Economic Order’ (nieo) at the un plenary. This power shift also reflected
in international debates on science and technology for development, where the
Group of 77 claimed more ‘access’ to science and technology.
I highlight, as example, the World Plan of Action for the Application of
Science and Technology for Development, presented in 1971 by the un Advisory
Committee on Science and Technology for Development acast. The plan was
clearly influenced by this new political climate and proposed three main targets
(un, 1971):
• developing countries should increase their domestic S&T output
• developed countries should intensify their aid to build up the science and
technology capacities in developing countries
• a portion of the R&D in developed countries should be focused on the
specific needs of developing countries
Acast had commanded an introductory chapter for the World Plan to a
group of experts at the University of Sussex. The chapter they wrote turned
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out to be a radical piece of criticism to the application of science and technology
in development aid. The document became known as the Sussex Manifesto. It
was innovative in that it left behind all discourses about ‘catch-up’ or about the
‘troubles with technology transfer’. Instead, the Sussex group sustained that
the real problem was not about increasing production but about improving the
local capability to produce 1. The Sussex group highlighted the importance of
how people, knowledge and environment interact to produce a particular state
of development (Shah, 2009). Development “depends on people with outlook,
knowledge, training and equipment to solve the problems posed by their own
environment, and thus control their environment rather than be controlled by
it” (Singer et al., 1970). The Sussex group called for changing the organisation
of economical and scientific production in developing countries themselves.
The radical viewpoint of the Sussex Manifesto was relegated to the annexes of
the World Plan (un, 1971). It is noteworthy, however, that the radical Manifesto
still argued for economic production as ultimate aspiration for the developing
countries.
The un organised a second Conference on Science and Technology for Devel-
opment in Vienna in 1979. Contrary to the first one in Geneva, this conference
was not on S&T at all, nor on appropriate technologies for developing countries.
Instead, it was about the national politics of both developed and developing
countries towards R&D institutions and technology transfers, as well as about
the structure and role of the un and transnational corporations (Standke, 2006).
The conference was political, rather than scientific. The participants were gov-
ernments, not scientists. Under pressure of the Group of 77 and their proposed
nieo, discussions were more about the ‘equitable access’ to science and tech-
nology and not about ‘technology transfer’. Despite this shift in attention,
discussions about ‘equitable access’ still adhered the mainstream philosophy
that the application of science and technology would lead to development. Any
critical voice questioning Western science and technology was kept out of the
conference (Shah, 2009).
The role of S&T within the UN structure has followed cyclical patterns.
Whereas the un has made strong efforts during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s to
give the field of S&T a highly visible role in its deliberations, today the UN is
no longer seen as a prime actor in this field (Standke, 2006). The World Trade
Organisation, founded in 1995, has partly taken over the negotiations about
access to technology and scientific knowledge.
The death of development aid The eighties and nineties witnessed the re-
turn of a neo-liberal ideology in development and a laudation of the beneficial
forces of the free market. Policy-based lending and the infamous Structural Ad-
justment Programs were the instruments. Towards the turn of the millennium
the market was abandoned again in favour of a stronger state and civil society.
Poverty alleviation and the poor were back at the centre stage. Banners of this
battle against poverty are the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and in the
1The Sussex Manifesto extensively wields the word ‘capability’, a concept that became
notorious a decade later through the work of Amartya Sen (1985). This is not a surprise,
since among the authors of the Manifesto are the founding members of the Science and Tech-
nology Policy Research Unit (spru), founded in 1966. This group developed the concept of
‘capability’. In the Sussex Manifesto, however, the concept is used only to refer to science
and technology capabilities.
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Millennium Development Goals (established in 2000).
Together with this renewed attention to the poor, another, completely new
tendency emerged: knowledge started to be given an explicit role in develop-
ment, although many visions spawned on what that role exactly should be.
Developing the Knowledge Economy At the same time that the free
market was abandoned as panacea for underdevelopment, there was a grow-
ing interest from scholars and development agencies to the role of knowledge as
economic good (for a history of this emergence, see King and McGrath, 2002).
New Growth Theory is grafted on classical Growth Theory, but extended with
the observation that knowledge-based activities have increasing returns, while
the returns in the physical economy diminish (Cortright, 2001). New Growth
Theory’s primary recommendation for developing countries is to bet on human
capital and education, in order to generate growth from knowledge-related activ-
ities and creativity (Cozzens et al., 2008). This economic paradigm was adopted
by the World Bank and is expressed, to some extent, in the 1998/1999 World
Development report Knowledge for Development, from which I have quoted the
first phrases in the introduction of this article (world bank, 1998). The phi-
losophy of the Knowledge Economy is much more explicit in other World Bank
publications (e.g world bank, 2001, 2007).
R&D and Innovation for Development Rooted in another strain of thought,
but closely related to the Knowledge Economy paradigm, is the theory of In-
novation Systems (Freeman, 1982; Edquist, 1997, amongst others). This theory
inscribes the generation of science, technology, innovations, and development,
into networks of actors and the relations among them: the innovation system.
The three categories of actors that are usually discussed in innovation systems
are: research institutions (both public laboratories and universities), govern-
mental bodies and private enterprises (Edquist, 1997). Behind the concept lays
an important shift about how technology is produced: the linear chain of inven-
tion–innovation–diffusion, has been replaced by a dynamic process of non-linear
learning between multiple agents.
Development policies that adhere the Innovation System theory seek to iden-
tify and promote the political configurations and strategical investments that
are needed to initiate or accelerate the process of innovation and technological
development in the innovation system at stake.
Innovation Systems have the merit of having drawn the attention to the wider
and plural milieu of knowledge production. Whereas ta was still primarily
concerned with one-to-one knowledge transfer, Innovation Systems has made
clear that the actual dynamic of knowledge production is many-to-many. Hall
(2005), in examining biotechnology in developing countries, found that many
Innovation Systems included not only research centres and the agro-business,
but also pro-poor grassroot organisations, farmer associations and development
actors. The challenge is to integrate this plurality of knowledge production and
usage, characteristic of the reality in developing countries, into the Innovation
Systems model and into ta (Wilson, 2007).
Knowledge Management When Wolfensohn was appointed president of the
World Bank in 1996 he declared that the Bank had to become a ‘Knowledge
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Bank’:
We have been in the business of research and disseminating the
lessons of development for a long time. But the revolution in in-
formation technology increased the potential vaule of these efforts
by vastly extending their reach. [. . . ] we need to [. . . ] enhance
our ability to gather development information and experience, and
share it with our clients. We need to become, in effect, the Knowl-
edge Bank.” (Wolfensohn, 1996)
The 1998/1999 World Development Report was an immediate effect of this
new line of thought in the World Bank. It puts together some ideas of ‘Knowl-
edge Economy’ with that of ‘Knowledge Management’ and ‘ict for Develop-
ment’.
In reference to Polanyi’s (1966) distinction between tacit and explicit knowl-
edge, Knowledge Management tries to convert the tacit knowledge of individual
experts or employees of an organisation into explicit knowledge and manage
it in a coprehensive way (Evers et al., 2009). The idea emerged in the 1990s
in private companies that grew aware of the potential of new icts. King and
McGrath (2004) distinguish two tendencies. The first or ‘technological’ ap-
proach is the one that tries to capture, store and distribute by means of ict
the knowledge that already exists among the experts in an organisation such as
the World Bank. The second or ‘social’ approach focuses more on connecting
people and putting them together in teams, in order to take advantage of their
tacit knowledge.
Wolfensohn, by stating that the World Bank had to become a Knowledge
Bank, clearly harnessed the technological approach in an aim to share the Bank’s
knowledge with the ‘clients’ through ict. Assigning itself the role of knowledge
broker, the World Bank adopted the ambitious goal of becoming the source of
best practice and cutting-edge development knowledge. For this purpose, the
World Bank created the Global Development Network. A web portal, the Global
Development Gateway, collects all possible development-related knowledge, cov-
ering topics as varied as economics, aids, natural resources management, . . .
Undp created a similar system, called surf (Evers et al., 2009). Other develop-
ment agencies have supported independent networks such as eldis or the Open
Knowledge Network.
Much can be said about the confined character of the knowledge that is
stored on such ict network, or about the hegemony of Western experts’ knowl-
edge, or about the limited access from the Global South. For such criticism, I
refer to Mehta (2001) and Evers et al. (2009).
ICT for Development As described above, the Knowledge Management
credo places much hope in modern icts. However, since the 21st century is
witnessing a digitalisation in all domains of life, from the economic over the
social to the political, icts have been invoked for development in many different
ways:
• The transfer of development-related knowledge, via the internet or satel-
lite, “at virtually no cost” (world bank, 1998, p.130).
• ict will bridge the digital divide between the ‘information-rich’ and the
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‘information-poor’, in order to instruct the information-poor and empower
their civil society.
• ict as instrument or as economic good in the Knowledge Economy
The first has been discussed in the Knowledge Management section. The
second and third usually constitute the ‘ict for Development’ or ‘ict4d’ dis-
course. The 2001 Human Development Report of undp, entitled Making New
Technologies Work for Human Development, argued that ict ‘enables’ develop-
ment as follows. Technological innovation improves human capabilities –such as
a healthy life, knowledge, creativity, and participation in the social, economic,
and political life of a community– and hence has a beneficial impact on eco-
nomic growth through general productivity gains. At the same time, improved
human capabilities are crucial to produce technological innovation. Therefore,
technological innovation and development are “mutually reinforcing, creating a
virtuous circle” (undp, 2001, p.28).
So, in a certain sense the undp report confirms that technology and society
co-evolve, as I have explained in section 2 of this article. Nevertheless, Avgerou
(2003) notes that the undp report chooses to emphasise by large one side of
the circle: that ict innovation will generate the desired development. Thus,
eventually, the report gives way to the deterministic view that ‘technological
advance’ entails ‘human development’.
The discussions on ict4d are intense and ongoing. The hopes are high, but
many projects fail. In fact, as is the case for any other technology, it has ex-
tensively been demonstrated that ict adoption and innovation is a process that
takes place within the formative conditions of a particular social and organiza-
tional context. The literature on ict in developing countries has accumulated a
substantial amount of empirical evidence, mainly case studies, that reveals the
situated manner in which information systems projects take shape within the
local communities that try to adopt it (Avgerou, 2003).
Capacity Building The Capacity Building 2 discourse explicitly opposes the
technological determinism in ta and other practices of K&T transfer. From the
1950s through the 1970s ta had exclusively relied on the employment of West-
ern experts, and its failure was no longer ignorable by the end of the eighties.
Criticism to ta was now growing within the major development organisations
themselves (for an overview, see Fukuda-Parr et al., 2002). A number of donor
evaluations in the 1980s led to debates in the donor community.
The oecd-dac issued in 1991 a document entitled Principles for New Orien-
tations in Technical Co-operation, which called for changes in existing practices.
A similar initiative was taken by undp, who performed a review, in collabora-
tion with local governments, of ta in 30 African countries. This undp report
(Berg and Seymour Whitaker, 1993) argued that ta had proven effective in get-
ting the job done, but less effective at developing local institutions or building
2The concepts ‘capacity’ and ‘capability’ have much affinity but should not be confounded.
The first roots in organisational and managerial sciences, as described by Ku¨hl (2009), and
is widely present in the current-day discourses of development agencies. The latter has a
background in economics and is not present to the same extent in the discourses of development
agencies. Amartya Sen’s interpretation of ‘capabilities’ (1985), however, is implicitly at the
basis of undp’s Human Development Index.
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local capacities. Actually, the contrary had happened: the old way of doing ta
had heightened dependence on foreign experts, and distorted national priorities.
The concept ‘capacity building’ was picked up from this report by Edward
V.K. Jaycox (1993), the then vice-president of the World Bank’s Africa section.
Berg and Jaycox’s message was that ta had to rely much more on local expertise,
rather than foreign experts. In this way, ta would stimulate and build up the
local capacities.
The earlier cited undp publication of 2002 (Fukuda-Parr et al., 2002) was the
real trigger for the spread of the Capacity Discourse in all development agencies.
It completely rejected ta and proposed capacity building as the ‘new solution
to old problems’. The document explicitly recognises that knowledge is always
embedded in a local context. Expert knowledge cannot replace local knowledge
in order to generate development; the recipients need to open up towards new
knowledge before it can be turned into endogenous knowledge. Therefore, de-
velopment aid should harness local expertise. Ownership and partnership are,
again, key words in capacity building.
“Rather than starting from a mail-order catalogue of standard parts
to be forced into likely looking slots, the challenge instead should
be fully to understand the local situation and move forward from
therestep by step. The major implication of this proposal is that it
puts a high premium on local rather than international expertise.”
(Fukuda-Parr et al., 2002)
Fukuda-Parr et al. (2002) argues that capacity is distributed over three levels:
the individual, the organisational, and the societal. With this, the capacity
building concept recognises that building up the capacities at the level of the
individual and the organisation is necessary but not sufficient. The agency of
the individual or organisation to apply its capacities depends on the capacities
of the society as a whole.
Ku¨hl (2009) identifies a second line of descent for Capacity Building, sit-
uated in Organisational and Managerial Sciences. He argues that Capacity
Building is the descendent of concepts like ‘Institution Building’ and ‘Institu-
tional Strengthening’, which were already in vogue in the development debate
in the sixties and seventies.
Since the nineties, the capacity building discourse has been picked up by all
major development organisations and donors. Whereas Wolfensohn (1996) and
the World Development Report (1998) had still fostered deterministic views on
knowledge for development, an internal World Bank review in 2001 suggested
that all the Bank’s knowledge activities should be directed to enhancing the
capacities of the clients (cited in King and McGrath, 2004, p.65-70).
After an euphemisation of the term from capacity building to capacity de-
velopment (Ku¨hl, 2009), the capacity discourse has gained a hegemonic status
within development cooperation. A commitment to developing the capacities
of beneficiaries is mandatory to get any medium or long term funding from any
major donor agency (Ku¨hl, 2009; Cherlet, 2011). Northern development ngos
are increasingly being screened by their donors to ascertain that they pay due
attention to developing the capacities of the beneficiaries.
It is not surprising that the concept, which is on the lips of most development
actors nowadays, has acquired multiple and often conflicting meanings 3 (Lipson
3The same is true for the concept ‘capability’. The terms ‘technological capability’, as
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and Hunt, 2008; Baser and Morgan, 2008; undp, 2010). Many views exist
about which capacities should be developed and what for (for a comprehensive
overview, see Baser and Morgan, 2008).
4 Discussion
The recent attention to K&T for development can be discussed from many dif-
ferent viewpoints: political, epistemological, organisational,. . . . In this section I
will limit myself to, on the one hand, disentangling the many meanings of K&T
for development, and, on the other hand, shedding some more light on techno-
logical and epistemic determinism as constant undercurrent in the genealogy.
Disentangling the different discourses Throughout history, since Enlight-
enment until today, K&T has been invoked for the sake of development in many
different ways.
Enlightenment and Evolutionism highlighted knowledge, science and tech-
nology as endogenous characteristics of civilisation. Western scientific knowl-
edge was the expression of the most advanced evolutionary stage a society could
attain. From Condorcet, over the Berlin Treaty, to the League of Nations, they
all invoked the superiority of Western knowledge and civilisation as motive to
help civilising the ‘inferior races’.
The role that Truman assigned to science and technology was radically dif-
ferent: he focused rather on the economic poverty of the underdeveloped world
and harnessed Western science and technology as exogenous tool for the gener-
ation of economic growth. Industrial technology and large infrastructure would
generate economic development. The (scientific) knowledge surrounding these
Western technologies was embodied by the Western experts who were sent out
for Technical Assistance. There was a heavy focus on the transfer of tech-
nologies but there were no particular efforts to foster knowledge production in
the beneficiary society itself. Knowledge as endogenous factor of development
seemed to be abandoned in favour of material production as endogenous motor
of development.
Since the late 1990s, knowledge has again assumed an endogenous role in
development, as can be deduced from the rise of the Knowledge Economy, In-
novation Systems or Capacity Building discourses. Obviously, these discourses
defend knowledge as endogenous in development for completely different rea-
sons. Other recent discourses, like ict4d, harness technology as an instrument
in development rather than goal, and confirm that the focus is now on knowledge
as endogenous factor in development. The central keyword of the last decade is
‘knowledge’, but it has been seized for very different goals: ‘capacity building’,
‘empowerment’, and ‘economic growth’.
So, throughout history discussions about K&T for development once favoured
technology, then knowledge, and vice versa. In one instance K&T were consid-
ered endogenous in development, in another instance they were exogenous tools
used by Singer et al. (1970), or ‘social capability’, coined by Abramovitz (1986), emphasise
the need for scientific and technical education in order to generate economic growth. Amartya
Sen’s ‘capability approach’ has a much wider scope and is about the ‘power’ or ‘freedom’ of
people to achieve human development (Sen, 1985, 1999).
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that should be transferred to generate development. K&T have been called
upon both as tool and as objective.
Moreover, when K&T have been invoked for development, this has been done
with varying aims. In the pre-Truman era, it was invoked for the civilisation
of the colonies. During the 1950s and 1960s it was invoked for producing goods
and economic growth. In the 1970s the role of K&T was alleviating poverty.
Nowadays, K&T is said to empower the people and to reinforce their capacities,
while others see it as the motor in the Knowledge Economy.
It is important to emphasise that different discourses of K&T for develop-
ment have existed along each other. Some of these discourses are mutually
supportive while others defend completely opposite messages. This is especially
true in the first decade of the twentieth century. When we scrutinise the credo
‘Knowledge for Development’, brought forward by the 1998/1999 World Devel-
opment Report (world bank, 1998), we note that the flag covers a number of
different cargoes. It includes elements of the Knowledge Economy, Innovation
Systems, Knowledge Management and ict4d paradigms. Undp, from its side,
also supports ict4d and online Knowledge Management initiatives, but it is
also a strong promoter of Capacity Building.
Finally, the genealogy of section 3 shows that at any point in history the
reigning paradigm was always contested, to some minor or larger extent, from
inside or outside the authoritative organisations.
Few has been said about whose K&T counts. All K&T discourses described
above favour Western knowledge. Capacity Building, as an exception, tries to
harness local expertise in order to build up local capacities, but still indigenous
knowledge is largely ignored. Despite the increasing attention from scholars to
indigenous knowledge, especially in natural resources management and conser-
vation (e.g. Berkes et al., 2000; Dove, 2006; Berkes, 2009), this attention has
not set roots yet in the major development agencies. The World Bank initiated
a programme on Indigenous Knowledge for Development in 1998, but the last
update of the programme’s web portal dates from 2005 and the latest ‘monthly’
newsletter was published in January 2007 (world bank, 2010).
Epistemic and technological determinism I remind the reader that tech-
nological determinism ignores the intense co-evolution of technology and society,
whereas epistemic determinism ignores that all knowledge is situated and em-
bedded in its particular social context. Apart from the different roles that have
been assigned to K&T in development, the degree of epistemic and technological
determinism in the interpretations has also varied widely. Some discourses are
particularly prone to epistemic and technological determinism, such as Techni-
cal Assistance, the ict4d, Knowledge Management, and Knowledge Economy
paradigm. That does not mean that they are imperatively deterministic. More
and less deterministic views exist along each other.
The Capacity Building discourse explicitly opposes epistemic determinism;
its raison d’eˆtre is the recognition that all knowledge is embedded in the local
social context. Innovation Systems, too, emphasise that knowledge creation
and learning happens through multi-actor interactions. But here again, the
Capacity and Innovation Systems discourses have been invoked for such a variety
of purposes that more and less deterministic versions co-exist.
In figures 2 and 3 I have sketched the rise and fall of the main discourses
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on K&T in development4. Additionally, I have measured each discourse against
two scales. The first scale (vertical scale in the grids of figures 2 and 3) measures
the degree of technological/epistemic determinism:
1. K&T presented as completely independent from the social context (indi-
cated as ‘INDEP’ in figures 2 and 3)
2. K&T presented as independent from social context, but some adaptation
to the local context will favour their success
3. K&T presented as embedded in the social context, but the discourse still
relies on the idea that one party learns from the other
4. K&T presented as completely embedded in the social context; any transfer
is very problematic as learning or innovation must happen within the social
context (indicated as ‘EMB’ in figures 2 and 3).
The scale focuses on only one of the two underlying ideas of technological and
epistemic determinism: the one that undergirds the conviction that K&T can
be transferred.
The second scale (the horizontal scale in the grids of figures 2 and 3) eval-
uates the aim for which K&T are invoked; it measures the degree of ‘economic
determinism’ in the discourse:
1. K&T exclusively invoked for social development, or for the empowerment
of the people (indicated as ‘SOC’ in figures 2 and 3)
2. K&T invoked for social development; the social development will also lead
to a more productive society
3. K&T invoked for economic development; this economic development will
also lead to social development
4. K&T exclusively invoked for economic development (indicated as ‘ECON’
in figures 2 and 3).
Beyond capacity building Wilson (2007) remarks that old-style Technical
Assistance as well as the more progressive Capacity Building focus on “learning
things that are already known by one of the actors”. Therefore, he distinguishes
‘learning from’ and ‘learning with’. The former still reigns development aid,
while instead it should focus more on the latter. ‘Learning with’ is inspired
by Habermas’s ‘ideal speech situation’, where different knowledges are equally
valued as possible source of creative learning and new knowledge production
(Wilson, 2007). ‘Learning with’ would be a mode of cooperation that fully
transcends epistemic determinism.
4All timelines in figures 2 and 3 are retrieved from the Google Books database (Michel
et al., 2011). The timeline of ‘Capacity Building’, for instance, shows for each year from
1940 until 2005 the relative occurrence of the 2-gram ‘Capacity Building’ among all possible
2-grams in the books published in that particular year. Different spellings of the n-grams were
taken into account. The graphs have been smoothed by floating ±1 averages and splines. The
timelines are included in this article to show tendencies, not absolute values. The author
judged that the four n-grams of figure 2 have very precise meanings and can be confronted in
one single graph. The n-grams of figure 3 have broad meanings and it is senseless to compare
their timelines.
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Figure 2: The rise and fall of K&T discourses, and their characteristics.
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Figure 3: The rise and fall of K&T discourses, and their characteristics.
That most development agencies have embraced Capacity Building, demon-
strates that there is a growing sensibility to the ‘situatedness’ of knowledge
and technology. Nonetheless, very deterministic discourses on K&T continue to
persist. Denning noticed an apparent contradiction:
“Ironically, at the very moment that it becomes technologically pos-
sible to move information instantaneously around the world, comes
the recognition that the context in which knowledge arose is often
crucial to understanding or exploiting it. Knowledge without con-
text is not knowledge at all.” (Denning, 2001)
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5 Conclusion
In the last chapter of their book, King and McGrath wondered whether knowl-
edge based aid was just a passing fashion just like so many other brandwagon
concepts in development aid (2004, p.196-7). They were convinced that it would
probably start losing importance when Wolfensohn’s reign would end in 2005.
By now Wolfensohn has left office, but knowledge is still at the core of the de-
velopment agenda. And this is exactly what I have tried to demonstrate in my
genealogy: that K&T, two very intimately linked concepts, have always been
at the core of development discourses. The question is: will Wolfensohn’s in-
terpretation of the role of knowledge last? The answer will probably be “no”,
it won’t last.
The genealogy that was sketched in section 3 has shown that the invoca-
tion of K&T in development discourses has an age-long descent. The idea of
‘knowledge for development’ emerged during Enlightenment, when the develop-
ment idea itself emerged. Since then, many different roles have been allotted
to K&T in development aid, once exogenous in the development concept, then
endogenous, and vice versa. The purpose for their invocation, too, has varied
widely: for civilising the ‘inferior races’, for economic development, for poverty
alleviation, for empowerment, capacities or freedom.
Two important things should be learned from the genealogy. First, that each
of the discourses emerges from a different intellectual and political background,
includes certain values, and conveys specific views on the organisation of social
and economic life. In sum, none of these discourses is neutral. Any one of these
discourses, when invoked by development practitioners, invests their professional
interventions with legitimacy and steers the beneficiaries towards specific world
views of agency over the knowledge or the technology.
Second, the development practitioners and the beneficiaries should be aware
of the epistemic and technological determinism that easily sneaks into ‘K&T
for development’ discourses. As Wyatt (2008) and Bijker (2010) remind us, not
only are epistemic and technological determinism false, the are also “politically
debilitating” and even “dangerous”. In fact, they unjustly wrests from society
its agency and control over the development of technology and it absolves society
from any responsibility to account for certain technological developments. For
instance, when a genetically improved crop seed is imported in a developing
country and presented as a saviour of hunger, it dispenses the local government
from its responsibility to guarantee fair food policies or stable food markets. It
also deprives the population of control over the development of the technology
and its possible side-effects.
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